

It is true that the Serbs claim to have monasteries virtually all over Kosovo, but I am confident that they would regard it as a compromise rather than a total defeat if they were allowed to see the Russians, rather than NATO, who is bombing them, occupy the most important sites, particularly in the far west and the far east of Kosovo.

Finally, we need to look at other mechanisms to either defeat the Serbs or perhaps more importantly to let the Serbs know that they may be defeated. Milosevic, I believe, is convinced that he can continue to occupy Kosovo because we will never send in ground troops. His tanks will be there as long as they hide among civilians or dig in so that they cannot be destroyed by our Apache helicopters. What Apache helicopter is going to fire at a tank if they put 10 or 20 unwilling Albanians on top of it? So he can keep his tanks and his heavy armor and his artillery in Kosovo unless a ground force, with tanks and with heavy armor and willing to take casualties, can be deployed against him.

When he sees us training an army of Albanians to use American tanks and American artillery and American heavy weapons, then he will know that such an Army may soon be deployed against him. At that point, a Russian brokered compromise will begin to look far more appealing.

We do not have to let the Albanians take control of these weapons. They can train on them during the day and American soldiers can retain them at night. Therefore, we are not even technically violating any of the rules against providing weapons to any of the residents or citizens of the former Yugoslavia since we are not giving them any weapons; we are just giving them training. If at some point in the future we decide to unleash them, we can give them the custody of those weapons and heavy armored divisions of Albanians with America's best armored weapons can move in to Kosovo along with the lightly armed KLA. That is what it would take to dislodge Milosevic, a ground army with both heavy weapons and lightly armed mobile soldiers and an army willing to take casualties.

I want to talk a little bit about the other alternative, and that is sending in NATO ground troops. One alternative is to send in NATO ground troops behind an Albanian Army, in support of it. Under those circumstances, NATO might take only slight casualties, but if instead NATO has to defeat by itself the Serbian Army deployed in Kosovo, then NATO will take casualties and then the danger is this: What if those casualties are too much for Americans to endure? What if those casualties are too much for the French to endure or the British or the Germans?

The first NATO nation that cries uncle and demands that its soldiers be withdrawn or even moved to the rear will cause the other NATO countries to

demand the same level of safety for their soldiers. If all of the NATO troops need to be put at the rear, then our efforts against Milosevic will be over. If that happens, then every tyrant and mass murderer in the world will feel that he can act with impunity. The Vietnam syndrome and the Somalia syndrome will return.

That is why we need at our disposal not only the KLA, and they are operating independently and they will get light weapons with or without us, but also another well-armed Albanian force.

In conclusion, the American people have shown their willingness to commit their treasure and more importantly the lives of our sons and daughters to preventing atrocity, ameliorating tragedy. If we realistically define our objectives and if we prepare to use all of the tools at our disposal, we may secure a reasonable life for the Kosovars, and just as important we may inspire the American people to use limited realistic efforts to try to stop the ongoing atrocities in Sudan and Myanmar, in the Congo and East Timor and elsewhere.

If instead we fail, if we devote inadequate resources to a pristine, perfect, no-compromise objective and fail to achieve it, then this is going to be a tragedy; first for those servicemen and women who die in an unsuccessful American effort.

□ 1845

More importantly perhaps even than that, it will be a tragedy for the Kosovars who will be told that well, we tried, but we did not use all of the options and we are too idealistic to make compromises, and so you will live your life here in a refugee camp.

Finally, if we use inadequate resources to try to achieve the absolute objective, it will be a tragedy for victims of atrocities around the world, both today and whatever atrocities are committed in the decades to come, by tyrants who at that time would know that America had tried in Kosovo unsuccessfully.

It will be a while before the administration is looking for new alternatives. They are convinced that the current strategy will be successful, and I hope that whatever comes out, it is good enough so that the administration can claim that it is a total victory and not a compromise. But we must begin to look at other alternatives, and if, in a few weeks, we recognize that the current strategy has not been successful, we must have the courage to use them.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

The following Members (at the request of Mr. McNULTY) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:

Mr. LIPINSKI, for 5 minutes, today.
Ms. NORTON, for 5 minutes, today.
Mr. STUPAK, for 5 minutes, today.
Mr. RUSH, for 5 minutes, today.
Mr. MEEHAN, for 5 minutes, today.
Ms. WOOLSEY, for 5 minutes, today.
Mr. TIERNEY, for 5 minutes, today.
Mr. DOOLEY of California, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. SMITH of Washington, for 5 minutes, today.

Mrs. MALONEY of New York, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. BLUMENAUER, for 5 minutes, today.

Ms. ESHOO, for 5 minutes, today.

Ms. LEE, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. GREEN of Texas, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. SANDERS, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. CAPUANO, for 5 minutes, today.

Ms. STABENOW, for 5 minutes, today.

Ms. CARSON, for 5 minutes, today.

Ms. HOOLEY of Oregon, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. BERMAN, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. MCGOVERN, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. CROWLEY, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. LUCAS of Oklahoma) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. NEY, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. ENGLISH, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. HULSHOF, for 5 minutes, on April 22nd.

Mr. KASICH, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. ROGAN, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. EHRLICH, for 5 minutes, on April 28th.

Mr. DOOLITTLE of California, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. DUNCAN, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. MCINTOSH, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at their own request) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. HINOJOSA, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. UDALL of Colorado, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Member (at his own request) to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. KNOLLENBERG, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Member (at his own request) to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. SWEENEY, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Member (at his own request) to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. LATOURETTE, for 5 minutes, today.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 6 o'clock and 48 minutes p.m.), the House adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, April 22, 1999, at 10 a.m.